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LAND FORCE

INFANTRY

AMBUSH AND COUNTER-AMBUSH

(ENGLISH)

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FOREWORD

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2. This publication is effective on receipt.

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5. **Terminology**. Unless otherwise noted, words imparting gender refer to both men and women

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PREFACE

AIM

1. The aim of this pamphlet is to outline Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine on the tactics, techniques and procedures of ambush and counter-ambush. It replaces B-GL-318-010/FT-001 *Ambush and Counter-ambush*.

APPLICATION OF B-GL-392-008/FP-001 AMBUSH AND COUNTER-AMBUSH

2. This pamphlet is the source document for use by all branches and contains information required by officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) to conduct operations and continuation training in ambush and counter-ambush.

3. The doctrine contained herein supplements both B-GL-392-001, *Section and Platoon in Battle*, and B-GL-392-004, *Patrolling*.

SCOPE

4. This pamphlet is divided into two chapters and should be used together;

a. **Chapter One—Ambush**. Contains information on the preparation, occupation and execution techniques required to successfully complete an ambush, and

b. **Chapter Two—Counter-ambush**. Contains information on the tactics, techniques and procedures used to counter the effects of an enemy ambush.

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CHAPTER 1
AMBUSHES

SECTION 1
GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

1. An ambush is a surprise attack upon a moving or temporarily halted enemy by a force lying in wait. It is usually a brief encounter and does not require the capture and holding of ground.

2. The ambush is undoubtedly one of the oldest stratagems of battle. Even the invention and refinement of modern weapons, motor vehicles and aircraft have had little effect on the ambush pattern and techniques. The attack from ambush in ancient days was an action at close quarters, and it still is, despite the range of modern weapons.

3. Ambushes may be used in front of and behind enemy deployment areas, against both regular and insurgent forces. A series of successful ambushes should make the enemy apprehensive and cautious in movement. Continued success should finally inflict a virtual paralysis on the enemy.

AIMS OF AMBUSHING

4. The aims of ambushing are as follows:

   a. **To Kill the Enemy**. Well-laid ambushes are an effective way in which to kill the enemy. They offer the opportunity to inflict high casualties on the enemy with minimum resources.

   b. **To Disrupt Enemy Movement**. Ambushes may be used in front of and behind the forward edge of the battle area. A series of successful ambushes will disrupt the enemy's freedom of movement.

c. **To Gain Information**. Ambushes can be laid as a means of obtaining information about the enemy or to capture a prisoner.

d. **To Provide Security**. Continued success in ambushing restricts enemy movement and reduces his ability to obtain information.

AMBUSH SITES

5. Suitable places for ambush include:

a. Known enemy routes in forward and rear areas.

b. Administrative areas and supply and water points. In counter insurgency operations, known or suspected food dumps and arms caches are particularly suitable.

c. Areas where a marked change of vegetation occurs, such as the junction of the tree line and tundra.

d. Probable lines of enemy withdrawal after a successful attack by our forces.

TYPES

6. There are two types of ambush:

a. deliberate; and

b. immediate.

7. **The Deliberate Ambush**. A deliberate ambush is one planned and executed as a separate operation. Generally, time allows for planning, preparation, and rehearsal in great detail. The deliberate ambush may vary in size from a small four-man ambush to a major operation using an Infantry battalion. Many opportunities exist for small-scale ambushes; the ambush of up to platoon strength is the normal size used. Successful large-scale ambushes are more difficult

to achieve but every opportunity must be taken to do so. Some examples of these are:

a. in counter insurgency operations, luring an enemy follow-up force into a prepared ambush position; and

b. when information provides exact enemy locations, such as an assembly area, or the movement of large numbers of reinforcements.

NOTE

The smaller the force the easier it is to introduce it into the ambush area, to control the operation, and to extricate the force after contact.

8. **The Immediate Ambush**. An immediate ambush is one set with a minimum of planning to anticipate imminent enemy action, or is a purely defensive technique by a force such as a patrol. In these circumstances, little or no time is available for reconnaissance before occupation of the site. The degree of success achieved depends upon the initiative of the commander concerned, prior rehearsal of proven drills and teamwork. A suggested drill for an immediate ambush by a patrol is described in Annex A. It should normally only be laid in areas where civilian movement by night is prohibited.

PREREQUISITES TO SUCCESS

9. Instantaneous co-ordinated action against a surprised enemy contained within a well covered killing zone is essential for success. This requires:

a. **Sound Intelligence**. Sound intelligence is essential for the success of an ambush. A detailed picture of enemy activity and intentions should be built up from all available sources. The details should enable the ambush commander to plan the size of his ambush, the type of ambush he has to employ, the

types of weapons that he requires and the ground best suited to catch the enemy by surprise.

b. **Thorough Preparation**. The preparation for an ambush includes planning, reconnaissance and rehearsals. These tasks must be undertaken with care so that all the factors which may influence the result of the ambush are taken into consideration and all possible eventualities are foreseen and rehearsed.

c. **Security**. It is necessary to deny the enemy knowledge of the friendly force's intentions during the preparation and execution of the ambush.

d. **Camouflage and Concealment**. In the ambush, protection from observation and surveillance is essential. The members of the ambush must be hidden and vehicles and routes must be camouflaged. Concealment from the air and from enemy night vision aids and/or electronic detection devices must be considered, as well as ensuring that there is an absence of light, noise, movement and abnormal smells.

e. **Good Control**. Good control is a prerequisite to the successful execution of an ambush. The ambush commander must provide himself with the means to command the ambush and to direct and control the actions of his firepower resources even when direct communication is not possible. He should position himself within the ambush in a location that facilitates this control.

f. **A Simple Clear Plan**. The plan for the ambush must be simple. It should cover all possible contingencies and must include clear directions on how the ambush is to be initiated and terminated.

g. **Maximum Use of Fire Power**. All available fire power must be coordinated to achieve the best result. The maximum weight of fire must be brought to bear on the enemy immediately—the

ambush is initiated so that the enemy does not have time to extricate himself from the kill zone.

h. **A High Standard of Battle Discipline**. Ambushing demands a high standard of battle discipline. Once in their fire positions, soldiers must remain motionless with safety catches off, refraining from scratching, slapping at insects, smoking, eating, drinking or relieving themselves. An ambush can be ruined by the accidental discharge of a weapon or by an excited soldier firing before the order is given. Unless this standard of battle discipline can be reached in all aspects, it is useless to embark on an ambush.

10. Very careful preliminary training is required as only well trained troops with the highest standards of camouflage, concealment and fire discipline can hope to achieve success. This must be impressed on all ranks engaged in ambush operations.

11. Sections 2 to 4 deal with points of planning and execution common to ambushes of all sizes. Points particularly relevant to small and large-scale ambushes are covered in Sections 5 and 6.

SECTION 2
PLANNING

AIM AND LIMITATIONS

12. The ambush commander is given the aim of the ambush by his superior. He may also be given limitations to the aim, such as the duration of the ambush and its general location. Once the aim of the ambush and any limitations to the aim are known, the ambush commander uses the military estimate process to prepare his plan.

13. The extent to which the ambush commander can complete his planning before leaving his base depends upon the availability of information and his knowledge of the ground. Until he has conducted a detailed reconnaissance it is not possible to complete his plan.

FACTORS

14. The following are some of the factors that must be considered when planning an ambush:

a. surprise;

b. security;

c. mission and assessment of tasks;

d. the enemy;

e. friendly forces;

f. fire support;

g. ground;

h. time and space;

i. obstacles;

j. control;

k. equipment;

l. grouping;

m. routes;

n. layout;

o. conduct;

p. administration; and

q. communications.

15. **Surprise**. The success of an ambush is dependent upon surprise being achieved. All planning must aim at achieving surprise. The means of achieving surprise include:

a. attention to security;

b. the selection of the ambush site;

c. effective camouflage and concealment;

d. the avoidance of a set pattern in layout and technique used in each ambush;

e. good battle discipline; and

f. radio discipline.

16. **Security**. Security is a combination of those measures undertaken to ensure information and planning details remain secret, as well as the provision of protection for the ambush party. The intention of the ambush force must be disguised from the outset. Consideration should be given to using other activities to mask the intention. For example, the ambush party could be inserted as part of a larger force engaged in a separate operation and may leave the main force in the vicinity of the ambush site, or an ambush party could be left behind after the main force has departed. Radio and telephone should never be used to discuss ambush plans.

17. The need for security may restrict prior reconnaissance to map or air photo reconnaissance, however, a final ground reconnaissance should always be conducted to confirm maps or air photo details.

18. **Mission and Assessment of Tasks**. The number of personnel deployed in the ambush site must be kept to the minimum required to complete the mission. This aids secrecy and concealment. If the ambush is likely to be protracted it may be necessary to provide relief. This affects the overall size of the ambush force but does not affect the strength of the ambush party itself.

19. Consideration of the assessment of tasks provides a breakdown of the ambush party into its functional elements and

desired strengths of each. There may be a limitation on the size of the ambush party imposed by a higher authority. The tasks normally include the following:

a. command and control;

b. security;

c. assault;

d. fire support;

e. cut-off; and

f. reserve.

20. **The Enemy**. A detailed knowledge of the enemy must be obtained from all available sources including patrol reports, recent contact incident reports, intelligence reports and summaries and information from local civilian inhabitants. Of particular interest to the ambush commander during the planning period are the following:

a. likely enemy strength, composition and method of movement;

b. front and flank security, main body and rearguard elements;

c. the means of identifying the enemy, particularly if operations are being conducted with allied troops;

d. the pattern of enemy defensive mortar and artillery fire;

e. enemy air activity, including the use of observation aircraft and the availability of tactical air support;

f. any recent enemy movement patterns, including their ability to concentrate; and

g. known enemy counter-ambush techniques.

21. **Friendly Forces**. When planning the ambush it is important for the commander to be aware of the locations of friendly forces operating near the area.

22. **Fire Support**. The short ranges involved in most ambushes limits the use of indirect fire support in the kill zone. However, indirect fire support is particularly suitable for delaying enemy reinforcements, supplementing cut-off forces, and delaying enemy follow-up during the withdrawal phase. Air support can also be valuable for these tasks, particularly in more open areas.

23. **Ground**. While possible ambush sites may be identified by careful study of air photographs and recent patrol reports (routes to the sites and the rendezvous point are usually selected in this manner), a detailed ground reconnaissance is essential to select:

a. covered lines of approach and withdrawal;

b. cover from view within the ambush area;

c. suitable locations for observation posts (OPs);

d. likely enemy escape routes;

e. suitable fields of fire;

f. detailed fire positions for fire support, assault and cut-offs; and

g. an acceptable base area in case of a prolonged ambush.

24. **Time and Space**. Consideration of this factor influences the planning as follows:

a. method(s) of transportation;

b. route selection; and

c. requirement for a base.

25. **Obstacles**. Maximum use should be made of both natural and artificial obstacles. The employment of artificial obstacles must, however, be given careful consideration as the use of wire in particular could prejudice surprise. Natural obstacles should also be used with care as they could provide cover for the enemy to escape. Artificial obstacles are most useful on likely enemy withdrawal routes and in dead ground that is difficult to cover with fire from the ambush site.

26. **Control**. Because there is little opportunity for orders once the occupation of the ambush site is under way, the following must be planned and made known to all members of the ambush party before deployment into the ambush site begins:

a. The sequence of occupation and deployment of groups within the ambush.

b. The signal for the initiation of the ambush including a secondary means in case of failure of the primary means. Both means of initiation should be co-located and controlled by the ambush commander. The support element commander should always be provided with back-up means of initiation because he has visual into the kill zone and can initiate the back up before the enemy passes through the kill zone.

c. The location of the ambush commander.

d. The means of communication between groups in the ambush.

e. The signal to be used to control stages of the ambush. The signals for ceasing fire and for each element's withdrawal, in accordance with the sequence in orders, to the rendezvous.

f. Alternative arrangements to be used if the ambush is detected or otherwise compromised.

27. **Equipment**. The equipment required depends both on the task and on the duration of the ambush. Other factors that affect the

type of equipment carried are the methods of movement to the ambush site and the type of terrain.

28. **Grouping**. An ambush is made up of a number of groups. The size of a group is dictated by the task of that group. In planning, provision may be required for rest by relieving in location.

29. **Routes**. The selection of routes into and from the ambush should be well clear of local inhabitants and provide cover from observation. Routes for the withdrawal should differ from those used on the way in.

30. **Layout**. The principles of ambush layout are:

a. **All Possible Approaches Must be Covered**. Information rarely gives the enemy's exact route. Irrespective of information gained, the enemy may still approach from an unexpected direction. The failure to consider this factor causes many ambushes to be unsuccessful. It is essential that all likely approaches be covered.

b. **The Ambush Must Have Depth**. To counter likely enemy offensive action after initiation, the ambush site must have depth. Setting an ambush on both sides of the killing zone has the advantage of restricting enemy escape routes. However, this layout has the following disadvantages:

(1) the killing zone may have to be crossed; and

(2) there is a high possibility of danger to our own troops.

31. If an ambush is set on only one side of the approach, it is easier to control.

32. The layout of an ambush site should be flexible enough to suit the nature of the ground and the mission. It may be possible to achieve the task of an ambush by using a minimum number of men and covering the selected killing zone with weapons such as the

Claymore and other command detonated explosive devices. However, reliance on one specific weapon system is generally not desirable and Claymores should only be regarded as a way of enhancing or augmenting the ambush.

33. **Conduct**. The following factors must be considered in regard to conduct of the ambush:

a. **Springing**. The ambush commander must place himself in a position where he can receive early warning of the enemy's approach and where he can initiate the ambush. His plan must include details of which weapons will spring the ambush, as well as alternative plans in case the enemy approaches from an unexpected direction or if he does not receive sufficient warning.

b. **Action After Springing**. The action to be taken by the ambush after springing is governed by the:

(1) nature of the task;

(2) anticipated enemy strength, his deployment and likely reaction;

(3) ground; and

(4) standard of training of the troops taking part.

c. The force may complete its task without actually executing an assault. This stationary technique is suitable when long fields of fire are available or there is little threat of envelopment. It can be used in close country, but for security it requires added depth and flank protection. It must be used when visibility or the going prevent manoeuvre after springing the ambush. Alternatively, there may be a requirement to search the kill zone or launch an immediate assault. The following factors should be considered:

(1) An enemy is always alert for an ambush. He could be warned by unusual or suspicious *movement, sounds or smells*. Once an ambush is sprung the enemy may react as follows:

(a) the leading elements, at least, dive for cover; and

(b) the leading elements, if following a practiced contact drill, assault into the ambush.

(2) Either reaction should occur in a matter of seconds. In the first case, the enemy will initially be confused due to surprise, casualties, noise and possible inability to locate the source of fire. There will be some loss of control. Panic may result, but with a well-trained enemy, counter-ambush drills or preparation for a more deliberate assault may be expected after the initial confusion.

(3) Our assault must commence immediately after the initial firing which should be restricted to seconds. This speed of action is essential so that the initial period of shock created in the enemy is further intensified by the assault.

(4) The plan for an immediate assault from ambush may include passing directly through the enemy to a rendezvous (RV) on the far side. Limitations in employment of this technique are:

(a) the ambush layout must be single sided and as close as possible to a straight line;

(b) the ground on the far side of the kill zone, as well as the approach to it, must be free of obstacles, both natural and artificial; and

(c) this technique is unsuitable if the aim of the ambush is the deliberate capture of a prisoner.

(5) An immediate assault not involving passing directly through the enemy is only suitable when the enemy force is small. It has the fundamental advantage of exploiting the surprise created, and providing an opportunity to search enemy dead. The problem of control is more difficult. This type of assault is aimed at complete destruction of a small force by closing with the enemy and mopping-up thoroughly.

(6) The deliberate capture of a prisoner by an ambush requires a detailed plan. The action after springing should provide for the following:

(a) isolating the prisoner by fire and by movement if necessary;

(b) seizing and securing the prisoner; and

(c) a sound plan for evacuation of the prisoner.

34. **Withdrawal**. The route and method of withdrawal have a bearing on the selection of the ambush site and frequently on the detailed layout. When an ambush is sprung and it is quite obvious that the aim of the ambush cannot be fully achieved, the ambush commander must make full use of the surprise and temporary confusion achieved. He must take the opportunity to inflict the maximum amount of damage on the enemy, and at the same time ensure a clean break. Under some circumstances, small parties may be

left behind to cover the withdrawal and to ambush any enemy relief force moving into the area. The use of defensive fire (DF) targets to assist the ambush party in achieving a clean break should be considered. Detailed plans for the withdrawal must be made. This involves specifying the sequence of movement of groups. Plans for withdrawal must cover:

a. action after springing;

b. action when no enemy enter the ambush site and the ambush is not sprung; and

c. action to be taken when too large an enemy force approaches or enters the ambush site.

35. **Alternative Plans**. Plans must be made to meet the unexpected. Alternative plans must be made, known and rehearsed.

36. **Administration**. A large number of ambushes are sprung within a few hours of setting and require no administration other than rest within groups. These are called short term ambushes and are the normal ambush.

37. Where ambushes are set for protracted periods it is necessary to make administrative arrangements for the relief of groups, feeding and rest. In protracted ambushes a secure administrative area must be established. It should be sited far enough away so that noises and smells do not disclose the presence of troops. Although the whole party in the ambush will eventually be relieved, the whole group must not be changed at the one time. Reliefs should take place when enemy movement is more unlikely. Ideally, each group in the ambush should be divided into three parties: a resting group, a reserve group and an ambush group, who are rotated through the rest area as required. This leaves two-thirds of the group in the ambush site at any one time.

38. The ambush commander must include provision in his plan for the following:

a. **Medical Arrangements**. He must include his casualty evacuation plan and any hygiene arrangements. The evacuation plan depends on:

(1) the remaining active strength of the force;

(2) the nature of the casualty;

(3) if the casualty occurs en-route, at the objective or on return;

(4) the distance to the nearest friendly location; and

(5) available areas for possible helicopter evacuation.

b. **Provision of Water**. When operating in more arid areas, water is a major consideration.

c. **Handling of Prisoners of War (PW)**. If PW are captured as a result of the ambush they require guarding and a method of restraint.

39. **Communications**. Communications requirements vary according to the size of the ambush. In a small ambush hand signals may suffice, whereas in a large ambush, line, radio, and light signals may have to be employed. As far as possible, signal systems should always be duplicated in case the primary means fails. Means of alerting individual members while in the ambush are also required. A length of vine or cord tied between members has proven successful but can also lead to the ambush being detected due to the noise and movement which might be generated.

SECTION 3
PREPARATION AND OCCUPATION

SEQUENCE

40. The sequences of preparation and occupation for ambush are:

a. reconnaissance;

b. issue of preliminary orders;

c. preparation and rehearsal;

d. move to the ambush area;

e. final reconnaissance;

f. final orders; and

g. occupation.

RECONNAISSANCE

41. If possible, the ambush commander should carry out a reconnaissance of the ambush site prior to the issue of preliminary orders. This is often impossible and initial reconnaissance is confined to a study of air photographs, maps and patrol reports.

42. During his reconnaissance the ambush commander should not walk in the kill zone, as foot marks or disturbed earth may warn an alert enemy. Therefore reconnaissance must be done from the rear of the selected ambush site. Observing the ground from the enemy point of view, though desirable, may prejudice security. The commander selects or confirms the following:

a. kill zone;

b. early warning and cut off groups;

c. command and control position;

d. release point;

e. assault position;

f. fire base/fire support;

g. objective rendezvous (ORV) and routes to and from it;

h. administration area, if necessary; and

i. withdrawal route.

43. The site selected should:

a. be easy to conceal, so that from the enemy point of view it appears unoccupied;

b. provide a good view of the kill zone;

c. allow all-round defence;

d. not offer an early escape to those enemy not killed when the ambush is first sprung;

e. allow sentries to give due warning before the first enemy enter the ambush;

f. allow all weapons to be effectively brought to bear; and

g. have a good covered approach avoiding contact with known enemy positions or local inhabitants.

44. **Detailed Siting**. After deciding on the general layout the commander must now consider the following points in detail:

a. **Positions of Support Weapons**. These must cover the kill zone with subsidiary roles of sealing each end of the ambush and covering likely enemy withdrawal routes. This can be achieved by dividing the kill zone into specific Kill Zones.

b. Ground not covered by automatic weapons must be covered by riflemen or Claymores.

c. If enemy vehicles or tanks are expected:

(1) the blocks required, for example trees and banks to be blown down,;

(2) the position of anti-tank mines, and

(3) the position of anti-tank weapons.

d. Careful selection of sentry positions covering enemy approaches, to alert the ambush before the enemy reaches the kill zone.

e. Cut-off groups should cover likely enemy escape routes. Artillery, mortars and command detonated mines may also be used for this task.

f. Grenades and Claymores may also be sited to protect the flanks and rear of the ambush against quick enemy counter action. For the protection of the ambush party they should be sited in defiladed ground. Consideration must be made in regard to the danger of using grenades at night.

ORDERS, PREPARATION AND REHEARSALS

45. **Preliminary Orders**. The ambush commander should brief his party with the aid of a model (sand model or map) as thoroughly as possible and as early as possible to allow the maximum time for preparation and rehearsal. An orders format is found at Annex B.

46. **Preparation**. Thorough preparation is essential. This is achieved by following the 15 Steps of Battle Procedure. Preparation may include the issue of extra automatic weapons because of the great reliance on heavy and immediate fire. In all cases,all weapons must be thoroughly cleaned, checked and tested to ensure their efficiency. Special stores, such as trip flares, may have to be assembled and tested.

47. **Rehearsals**. Rehearsals should be conducted in accordance with the 15 Steps, with the Patrol Commander conducting the rehearsals concerning Action at the Objective and Occupation of the ORV. The Patrol second-in-command (2IC) should conduct all other rehearsals, therefore providing more time for the commander to prepare for the ambush. As a guide, the rehearsal should:

a. show troops their positions relative to each other;

b. show how relief, if any, will take place;

c. cover the springing, assault and withdrawal phases;

d. eliminate any tendency to fire high or failure to aim when firing;

e. develop team work; and

f. test communications and signals.

NOTE

The rehearsals should aim at saving time and lengthy orders when the actual ambush site is reached. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. If illumination devices are to be used in the ambush they should be used in the rehearsal, however, care must be taken not to compromise the patrol.

48. **Move to the Ambush Area and Final Reconnaissance**. The main body should not move directly to the ambush position. It should assemble short of the ambush position, in an ORV. Once secure in the ORV, the reconnaissance party goes forward to see that no enemy are present and, if it has not previously been done, the commander should carry out a visual reconnaissance.

49. **Final Orders**. If preliminary orders are issued before reconnaissance, or if last minute changes are necessary, there will be a need to modify the plan in the ORV. Such final orders must, however, be brief but include:

a. a description of the ambush area and kill zone;

b. final location of the commander; and

c. any variations from the rehearsal in regard to individual tasks.

OCCUPATION—LARGE SCALE

50. Individual camouflage must be checked before moving forward to occupy the position. Since the enemy may move into the kill zone as the ambush is being laid, occupation must be carried out stealthily from the rear with only a few men moving at a time.

51. The normal sequence for occupation of a Large Scale ambush is:

a. sentries or observers take up their positions and communications are established with the commander;

b. support, and if applicable, anti-tank weapons are brought forward to cover the kill zone;

c. flares, Claymores, anti-tank mines, grenades and charges are set;

d. the remainder of the party, including troops in depth for rear and flank protection and cut off parties, are placed in position; and

e. reliefs, if any, are shown the ambush site and then moved back to the base or administration area.

52. Care must be taken to avoid giving away the ambush to the enemy. Particular attention should be paid to:

a. Paper scraps, foot prints, bruised vegetation, trip wires and reflecting surfaces.

b. Items with a distinctive smell should be left behind. Cigarettes, candy, chewing gum and other aromatic food must not be carried.

c. The sound of gun stakes being banged into the ground should be muffled by the use of sand bags placed over the top of the stake.

d. Any members of the patrol who have the flu or a cough must be left out of the patrol.

e. Weapons must be cocked and in a state of instant readiness to fire during the wait.

f. Any civilians who are suspected of having discovered the ambush should be held where they can not give warning until after its successful completion.

53. Each individual soldier in the ambush area must be responsible for:

a. personal camouflage;

b. taking up the best available firing position; and

c. remaining still and silent for protracted periods.

LYING IN AMBUSH

54. Troops must be trained to select a comfortable position and remain in it without movement or noise for the whole of the time they are in the actual ambush site. This may be some hours. Specific orders must be given concerning eating and drinking.

55. Weapons must be cocked before moving into position and safety catches left off once the ambush has been set.

56. If all members of the ambush observe continuously, no rest is possible and keenness will deteriorate. On the other hand, the kill zone must be under observation at all times. This is achieved by rostering observers within groups. The ambush commander and his second in command relieve each other. Other members relax but remain so that, without undue movement, they can fire on their arcs as soon as they are alerted. Furthermore, a 100 per cent stand-to should be initiated on initial occupation and at first and last light.

57. Whether the ambush party needs relief depends on the number of troops available and the duration of the ambush. Reliefs

are made only when essential, but troops should not be left in an ambush site too long merely to avoid the problems of relief. In still air conditions, when the temperature and humidity are high and there is no effective shade from the sun, the alertness and efficiency of troops will deteriorate rapidly to the extent that security is threatened, unless counter measures are taken. To safeguard the effectiveness of an ambush in these circumstances, the troops must be acclimatized and relieved regularly before deterioration sets in. Adequate water should be provided for the ambush period. Reliefs must be planned, each man being relieved, quietly and one at a time. In winter operations, prevention of cold weather injuries such as hypothermia and frostbite must be considered. The use of air mattresses while lying in snow could also be considered.

SECTION 4
EXECUTION

SPRINGING THE AMBUSH

58. When a sentry sights the enemy he communicates via tug line, radio or telephone and gives the signal for the direction of approach and size of the enemy party. When the enemy appears in the kill zone each man aims awaiting the order to fire. The ambush should be sprung when as many enemy as possible are in the kill zone and the range has been reduced to a minimum. There must be no half-heartedness or premature action. All men must clearly understand their orders, and the drill for opening fire as follows:

a. A small-scale ambush is normally sprung by the commander, but should any enemy act as though he has seen the ambush, any man who sees this action should spring the ambush. Because of the risk of the ambush being prematurely sprung, only well-trained and experienced soldiers should be sited in those positions close to the kill zone where an alert enemy could discover the ambush.

b. All shots must be aimed to kill. Once fire has been opened men often have to adjust their positions to fire at moving targets.

c. Firers must fire only within their allocated arcs in order to stop any potential firing into friendly positions.

59. The commander should be so placed that he has a good view of the enemy. The commander initiates the ambush by a prearranged signal which would normally be:

a. an aimed burst of fire from an automatic weapon;

b. the command detonation of Claymores, explosives or grenades; and

c. the setting-off of a booby trap or trip flare.

60. The commander must always make alternative arrangements for springing the ambush in the event of something going wrong with the person or method nominated. A deputy commander should always be appointed and the chain of command in seniority must be known.

SUBSEQUENT ACTION

61. Once the ambush is sprung, subsequent action proceeds according to the plan, i.e., either an immediate assault or remain in the ambush positions. Normal action is to maintain a heavy volume of fire until the enemy has been destroyed. The fire fight should normally be of a short duration. The signal to stop fire can be given by the commander—voice or a flare is suggested—or, as it is difficult to hear over machine gun (MG) fire, the cease fire could occur after a predetermined amount on ammunition has been fired, i.e., 100 rounds for C6/C9 or 20-40 rounds for C7. After the cease firing order is given the Assault Element moves in or the ambush party is withdrawn.

62. If required, the Assault Element assaults the objective and carries out the following:

a. Check the kill zone for enemy and secure any who are still living. The conduct of searches of dead and equipment behind the ambush site should also occur, whenever possible.

b. Search the surrounding area for dead and wounded.

c. Set demolitions to destroy enemy vehicles and equipment.

d. Collect the enemy's arms, ammunition, equipment and documents.

e. If required, photograph the bodies for identification.

63. If the aim of the ambush is to secure a prisoner, specific members of the ambush party must be detailed in orders, rehearsed and equipped with adhesive tape gags, garrottes, signal cable or toggle ropes to ensure that prisoners are seized and escorted quietly and quickly to the rendezvous. Reserves should also be detailed for these tasks to provide for possible casualties.

64. **Tracker Teams**. Some enemy that have been wounded in the ambush may attempt to escape by rushing into the undergrowth and lying low until the ambush has withdrawn. If the operational situation permits the employment of trackers it quite often leads to their capture.

WITHDRAWAL

65. It is at this stage that the ambush is most vulnerable. If no assault is planned, a fast withdrawal should be made during the brief period of enemy confusion and before he has re-established control. A rendezvous is necessary for the ambush party as members may take some time to clear the site. If an assault is planned, a search of victims and collection of prisoners is required, planning must include arrangements for the withdrawal of these groups covered by the remainder of the party.

66. The method of withdrawal is covered in orders and must be well rehearsed. The following control measures are necessary:

a. **Signal**. All must know the signal and the sequence of withdrawal.

b. **Route**. Must be known to all.

c. **Check Point**. A check point between the ambush site and the rendezvous may be required. For a small-scale ambush this is the Release Point.

67. Troops make a clean break from the ambush site, and concentrate at the rendezvous quickly and in an orderly manner. Time in the rendezvous must be short; the force must be checked, formed up and moved-off as quickly as possible. More than one route of withdrawal may be necessary. It may be desirable and practicable to set a further ambush along the withdrawal route.

68. A normal sequence for withdrawal is:

a. ambush party by groups;

b. sentries/security elements; and

c. troops in depth.

69. **Casualties**. Arrangements must be made before occupation for the evacuation of both our own and enemy casualties. Stretchers or material for improvising stretchers may be dumped at the rendezvous so that the minimum time is lost during withdrawal.

AMBUSH AT NIGHT

70. Night ambushes are often the most successful because enemy movement generally increases during the hours of darkness.

71. Night ambushes have similar characteristics to ambushes by day. Particular points which apply to night ambushes are as follows:

a. Concealment is easy but shooting is much less accurate. Fire at night tends to be high and bayonets may be fixed in order to lower the barrels of weapons to prevent firing high.

b. Automatic weapons become the essential fire elements, single shot weapons being too slow to produce the necessary volume of fire.

c. All weapons, particularly machine guns firing down tracks, should have their left and right arcs of fire fixed by means of stakes, etc, to eliminate danger to own troops.

d. The ambush party must never move about. Any movement is regarded as enemy.

e. Clear orders, precise fire control instructions, clear rendezvous and signals are essential.

f. Men and groups will be sited closer together than by day. Control at night is extremely important.

g. It is difficult to take-up an ambush position at night. Where possible it should be occupied before last light.

h. Consideration must be given to a method of illuminating the kill zone at the moment the commander wishes to spring the ambush. Illumination can be provided by means of trip flares set-off by the ambush commander either electrically or by pulling a trip wire. Illumination rounds can also be used if vegetation permits. Flares may be set-off by animals, so it is generally better if they are command detonated.

i. The flares should be sited so that they illuminate the enemy whilst at the same time, members of the ambush are shielded from the direct glare of the light. Notes on the use of flares are included in Annex C. The use of night vision goggles (NVG's), Kite Sites and other night viewing devices should also be considered.

j. Trip flares can also be connected to Claymores to detonate simultaneously with the command detonation of the Claymore.

SECTION 5
SMALL DELIBERATE AMBUSHES

INTRODUCTION

72. This section deals in particular with the layout of small-scale deliberate ambushes that are up to platoon size in strength. The layouts described are particularly useful in counter insurgency operations.

OCCUPATION—FIGHTING PATROL SCALE

73. For a Platoon sized or smaller scale ambush that is organized into the elements of a Fighting Patrol (refer to B-GL-392-004, *Patrolling*), the following occupation sequence should be followed:

a. Leaders Reconnaissance Party, comprising of the Patrol Commander, Navigation Team, Security Team 'A' and the Support Element and Assault Element commanders move from the Objective Rendezvous (ORV) to a Release Point (RP). Security Teams 'B' and 'C' are positioned as early warning on each flank of the ambush site.

b. Leaders Reconnaissance Party moves from the RP to a Vantage Point (VP) that is sited within direct observation of the ambush site and objective.

c. Security Team 'A' clears the ambush site and returns to the VP.

d. The Patrol Commander moves forward with the Reconnaissance Party and identifies the locations for early warning, Assault Element and Support Element. The party then returns to the VP and Security Team 'A' remains in the VP while the remainder of the Party returns to the RP.

e. The Navigation Team returns to the ORV and brings forward the patrol to the RP. Security Team 'D' remains in the ORV.

f. The patrol moves from the RP to the location identified by the Patrol Commander. Note that elements do not need to pass through the VP. The Patrol 2IC occupies the VP with Security Team 'A' and the Navigation Team remains in the RP.

g. The Assault Element occupies a position at right angles to the Support Element. If the Patrol Commander is to be located with the Assault Element, he must ensure that the Support Commander springs the ambush with maximum firepower.

74. The Assault Element normally consists of a search team, PW team, demolitions team and casualty evacuation team.

LAYOUT

75. Elements may be employed in two ways:

a. **Area Ambush**. Where there is more than one approach, all approaches must be covered. Approaches should be covered in depth to catch enemy scattering from the position of the ambush known as an area ambush. (See Figure 1-1.) It consists of a series of small groups, each with its own commander, sited as part of an overall plan to encompass a particular enemy party which is expected. The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups move by selected routes to their positions. The ambush commander may be able to position only one group in detail, leaving the remainder to be positioned by the group commanders themselves.



NOTES

1 Small ambush groups are posted at A, B, C, D.

2 Groups are sited as part of an overall plan to ambush an enemy party whose exact direction of movement is unknown.

3 The commander must ensure each group is positioned correctly, knows the location of others and fire is only within designated arcs.

Figure 1-1: Area Ambush

b. **Limited Ambush**. When, because of the ground, there is only one likely approach, a group or groups may be sited in depth with all-round defence at a place on that route which gives adequate concealment. This is a limited ambush. It is used when the area ambush is impossible or as part of an area ambush, along a very likely approach track. Basic forms of limited ambushes are L Shaped (Figure 1-2A), V Shaped (Figure 1-2B) and Straight Line (Figure 1-2C).



L Shaped Ambush- In this formation the assault and security elements are positioned in a similar fashion to a basic yard. Security teams must be under cover. The Vantage Point (VP) is manned by "A" Security.

Figure 1-2A: L Shaped Ambush



Figure 1-2B: V Shaped Ambush



Straight Line Ambush- In this formation the assault and support elements are parallel to the long axis of the kill zone and subject the objective to heavy flanking fire. A disadvantage is that the lateral dispersion of the target may be too great for full coverage. "A" Security mans the Vantage Point (VP).

Figure 1-2C: Straight Line Ambush

SECTION 6
LARGE DELIBERATE AMBUSHES

SIZE

76. The term large-scale ambush implies that the strength of the ambushing force is at least one company and possibly up to a battalion in size. With greater numbers, greater difficulty is experienced in achieving surprise, which is nevertheless essential to success.

PROBLEMS

77. The principle problems facing the commander of a large-scale ambush are:

a. introduction of his force into the ambush area;

b. concealment of the elements of the ambush force; and

c. command and control, including:

(1) timing for the springing of the ambush;

(2) canalizing the enemy lines of withdrawal;

(3) positioning of his own headquarters (HQ) for control of all elements of his force;

(4) coordination of fire between his forces; and

(5) adequate time for reconnaissance, arranging the ambush and for rehearsal.

REACTION AND COUNTER

78. Any enemy force that warrants the setting up of a large-scale ambush is normally moving considerably dispersed. His likely reactions on the ambush being sprung are:

a. immediate assault to break out of the ambush; and

b. dispersion into small groups with stay-behind parties to cover the withdrawal.

79. To counter these problems, the ambush commander must be prepared to:

a. accept considerable dispersion between the elements of his own forces;

b. ensure that the enemy main body is within the ambush area before opening fire;

c. employ blocking and cut-off forces with considerable firepower; and

d. form a mobile reserve for offensive tasks.

STATIC AMBUSHES

80. Where the problem of concealing the elements of a large-scale ambush does not exist and where the enemy pattern of movement allows and his line of advance can be reasonably predicted, it is suggested that the ambush might take the form shown in Figure 1-3.



NOTES

1. A Coy is deployed astride the enemy's lines of advance to act as the first blocking force and is prepared to fight a defensive battle in the face of an enemy assault.

2. B Coy is deployed to a flank in concealed positions along the enemy line of advance to:

   a. fire into the enemy main body when the ambush is sprung; and

   b. assault into the ambush if required.

3. C Coy is deployed to a flank, probably at a distance from the line of advance with the task of:

   a. acting as the cut-off force for the ambush;

   b. moving to assault the enemy from the rear; or

   c. preventing a relief force from reaching the ambush.

4. If full concealment is possible, this company may sometimes be in a position astride the line of advance initially but does not disclose its presence until the blocking force has opened fire.

5. D Coy is deployed to the flanks at some distance as the commander's mobile reserve.

Figure 1-3: Large-Scale Static Ambush

MOBILE AMBUSHES

81. It often happens that:

a. it is not possible to conceal an ambush of battalion strength in close proximity to the ambush site;

b. the enemy clears his line of advance with soldiers on foot; and

c. the enemy may advance well dispersed.

82. In any of the above cases, the commander of the ambush force must be prepared to lay a more mobile type of ambush. The problem of control in such cases is greatly increased. Figure 1-4 shows an example of this form.



NOTES

1. The essential differences between a static and mobile ambush are:
   a. Greater dispersion along the enemy lines of advance.
   b. All companies, including the dispersed platoons of the blocking company, are deployed far enough away from the ambush for concealment and to avoid being discovered by the leading enemy elements clearing the route. They must be prepared to move in quickly to take up fire positions, or to assault into the ambush if necessary.
2. In both Figures 1-3 and 1-4, demolitions, minefields, heavy fire support (both armour and artillery) have been omitted for simplicity.
3. Springing an ambush of this type poses many problems, the solution of which varies in each case. Some points are:
   a. The commander should be concealed close to the ambush site with duplicated communications to his observation posts. He may, on occasion, be located with the blocking force.
   b. Observation Posts must be carefully concealed either in trees or dug into scrub.
   c. Pre-planning must be done in case of communications failing and a deputy commander appointed who must be given authority to spring the ambush in specific circumstances.

Figure 1-4: Large-Scale Mobile Ambush

SECTION 7
TRAINING

GENERAL

83. Ambush training must be aimed at eliminating common faults and improving techniques such as:

a. Training of troops to occupy positions without advertising their presence by footprints, movement by individuals when the enemy is approaching, and the noise of weapons being cocked or safety catches and change levers being moved.

b. Ensuring the proper positioning of commanders and siting of weapons. A lack of all-round observation can result in the enemy arriving in the area undetected.

c. Improvement of fire control and particularly the even distribution of fire.

d. Ensuring accurate shooting at moving targets and reduction of the tendency for men either to select and fire at the same target, high or outside his designated arcs.

e. Improving the care of weapons and preventing misfires and stoppages occurring through failure to clean, inspect and test weapons and magazines.

f. Developing simple and sound standard operating procedures (SOPs) that all members of the ambush understand.

CAUSES OF FAILURE

84. The following are some reasons for failure which have been reported by ambush commanders and which may help in training:

a. Disclosure of the ambush by the noise made by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers. Check your weapons, practise men in silent handling and ensure that all weapons are ready to fire.

b. A tendency to shoot high at the face of the enemy. This can be corrected by conducting night range practices utilising night vision devices and fixing bayonets when possible.

c. Disclosure of the ambush position by footprints made by the ambush party moving into position and by the movement of individuals at the crucial time when the enemy is approaching.

d. A lack of fire control as commanders were unable to stop the firing and start the immediate follow-up.

e. Commanders were badly sited with consequent lack of control.

f. A lack of all-round observation resulting in enemy arriving in the area of an ambush unannounced.

g. Misfires and stoppages through failure to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.

h. A lack of a clearly defined drill for opening fire.

i. A tendency for all to select and fire at the same targets.

j. Fire opened prematurely.

FIELD FIRING—AMBUSH PRACTICES

85. The constant need for shooting practice must be emphasized. The object is to practise fire control and shooting from an ambush position, in conditions representing, as nearly as possible, an operational ambush. The requirements, which are easy to fulfil, are:

a. **Ambush Position**. This should be large enough for about a section and needs careful selection. Natural cover is required and therefore the position should be left untouched as far as possible.

b. **Kill Zone**. The kill zone should look as natural as possible from the ambush position, but trenches need to be dug in order that targets and markers can be moved about. If the ground allows, there should be several trenches at different angles, so that targets may approach and withdraw from different directions.

c. **Safety Precautions**. Personnel responsible for conducting field firing ambush practices must ensure that all safety precautions detailed in B-GL-381-001/TS-000 *Training Safety* and in individual weapons publications are complied with.

d. **Ingenuity**. A fields ambush depends on realism for success. The following points are useful:

(1) All actions by troops in the ambush position must be fully tactical, eg, positions taken up silently, camouflage, and clear orders.

(2) A wait should be imposed to introduce realism. Targets should appear with the minimum of warning. Once fire has opened targets must move rapidly.

(3) Firing should be both by day and by night.

CHAPTER 2
COUNTER-AMBUSH

SECTION 1
GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

1. In all levels of conflict, any military force that has to move is vulnerable to attack by ambush. This includes columns and patrols moving on foot, vehicle convoys, trains and rivercraft. The object of the attack from ambush varies from complete destruction of the target to the imposition of delay.

RESPONSIBILITIES

2. The whole area of operations is vulnerable to attack and ambush. Movement of road convoys outside a controlled area in support of offensive operations in depth is extremely hazardous and always liable to large-scale enemy ambush — particularly on the return journey. Everyone must be aware of the threat of ambush and must be proficient in counter-ambush drills.

3. The enemy will be less confident of their ability to execute an ambush if they are unable to achieve worthwhile results from such operations, or if they suffer heavy casualties because of our counter action. The enemy ambush can be beaten by immediate positive offensive measures which are thoroughly understood and practised by all soldiers. Counter measures can be divided into:

a. precautions taken to avoid or detect an ambush; and

b. action on being ambushed.

SECTION 2
COUNTER-AMBUSH ACTION FOR A FORCE MOVING ON FOOT

AVOIDANCE OF AMBUSH

4. Any column or detachment moving outside a secure area must be prepared to counter enemy ambush tactics. The obvious measure is to avoid being ambushed. This may be done by denying the enemy knowledge of our movements or by detecting the location of possible enemy ambush sites.

5. To avoid ambush:

a. Routine movement must be reduced to a minimum. Routes and timings must be varied to avoid establishing a pattern.

b. Except in completely secure areas, roads and tracks should never be used if they can be avoided.

c. Security of impending operations and movement must be maintained until the last possible moment.

d. Plan and use deception whenever possible.

e. During movement, full dispersion and movement by bounds must be practised and controlled. All movement must be tactically grouped.

f. Thorough reconnaissance to the front and flanks is required. Helicopters are useful for this task and for landing troops to search selected areas if necessary.

g. Maps, air photographs, patrol and other reports must be studied to find likely ambush sites. These should be cleared on foot.

h. Warning of enemy ambushes may be obtained from the local population.

BREAKING OUT OF AN AMBUSH

6. A force laying an ambush has the advantages of selection of site, initiative and surprise. A force moving on foot must always be prepared to counter enemy ambushes. The basis of the counter-ambush battle is controlled, immediate offensive action. This involves the immediate return of fire by those caught in the kill zone and a controlled reaction by the rest of the force.

7. It is appreciated that there can be no hard and fast rule for breaking out of an ambush. There are, however, two essentials that are common to all counter actions. These are:

a. Immediate offensive action must be taken to break out of the kill zone as rapidly as possible. At lower levels immediate action drills are used for this purpose.

b. Commanders must retain control. Alternative arrangements for command must be made in case the commander is lost in the first contact.

8. A suggested immediate action drill for use when caught by an enemy ambush is described in Annex D. This drill is particularly suited when only part of the force is caught in the kill zone and the enemy ambush is established in a linear formation.

9. A different drill particularly suited to close country and to restricted enemy fields of fire is an immediate assault in one direction into the ambush. Such a drill must be planned and rehearsed prior to the action. The only orders required, if any, are "Follow me", "Charge" or some other simple words to achieve an immediate reaction.

10. Enemy ambush tactics vary and opportunism and initiative by group commanders and individuals are always required in the counter-ambush battle. Planning should consider the possibility of the enemy using blocking parties to counter our immediate action drill.

ACTION IF ONLY PART OF A FORCE IS AMBUSHED

11. The portion ambushed must take aggressive action to fight its way out of the immediate kill zone using fire and movement if necessary. This part of the force then forms a hasty defensive perimeter sited if possible to bring fire on to the ambushers. Obvious reorganization positions are always suspect as the enemy may have laid mines or booby traps in these areas.

12. The remainder who are not caught in the actual ambush must do an immediate attack against a flank. Contact with enemy blocking parties must be anticipated. Full advantage should be taken of available artillery or close air support if available. If, however, this would delay the mounting of the attack, its advantages should be carefully weighed against the requirements to relieve the ambushed force.

ACTION IF THE WHOLE OF A FORCE IS AMBUSHED

13. The force must take aggressive action to fight its way out of the immediate kill zone. The following courses are available:

a. Launch an immediate assault. This is dependent upon the degree of control retained in relation to the enemy's main strength and dispositions.

b. Form a hasty defensive perimeter whilst the commander decides whether to attack part of the ambush in order to break out, or whether the force should break down into small groups to filter out. In either case, the force must later reform at a pre-planned rendezvous.

c. On occasion, during the immediate assault to break out of the kill zone, it may be possible to seize ground on which a reasonable defensive perimeter can be established. The aim would then be to hold this perimeter, to bring in support against the enemy position or to wait the arrival of a mobile relief force. Such action often forces the withdrawal of the enemy ambush and has the advantage that it

prevents our own wounded and equipment from falling into enemy hands.

COUNTER-AMBUSH BY NIGHT

14. As night ambushes are difficult to execute they are likely to be on a small scale only.

15. If a force is ambushed at night, action should be taken as follows:

a. They must move out of the kill zone at once. This is especially important if the area has been illuminated.

b. They must fight their way from the ambush to a pre-planned rendezvous (RV).

c. Commanders must retain control. If lost, it must be regained as soon as possible.

SPECIAL POINTS FOR COUNTER-AMBUSH

16. The following points must be remembered by commanders moving forces in areas where they are likely to be ambushed:

a. In order to increase confusion the enemy will aim to destroy commanders and radio operators in the opening volleys of an ambush. Commanders with their radio operators must not be conspicuous and must avoid moving in a set pattern within a column. Badges of rank should not be obvious. Radio operators must be protected and unless the sets are being operated, aerials should be concealed.

b. During movement, maximum dispersion commensurate with control, must be practised. The aim must be to ensure that the whole of the force is not simultaneously ambushed. Forces that are closed-up make themselves vulnerable to a

comparatively small ambush. This is particularly applicable to the rear of a column.

c. A pre-planned rendezvous must be known to all ranks and, if possible, should not change en route. Some suggestions are:

(1) A set distance (500 metres) from the rear of the column and back along the direction of approach. This is probably not suitable for forces larger than a platoon.

(2) The location of the last long halt.

SECTION 3
COUNTER-AMBUSH ACTION FOR VEHICLE CONVOYS MOUNTED TROOP CARRYING VEHICLES

GENERAL

17. It is highly likely that an enemy will attempt to ambush vehicle columns. It is essential that all vehicle columns be, therefore, protected by troops who have been trained in counter-ambush drills.

LIKELY AMBUSH SITES

18. As wheeled vehicles have restricted cross-country mobility, their movement is mainly on roads and tracks. The enemy is, therefore, likely to take advantage of naturally occurring obstacles such as crossing points, bridges, defiles and washways and use these as ambush sites. Roadblocks are normally created to enhance his position and are usually sited on road bends or on tops of crests so that they are not seen until leading vehicles are upon them.

ORGANIZATION OF A VEHICLE CONVOY

19. **Preparation of Vehicles**. Troops travelling in vehicles must have all-round visibility and arcs of fire and be able to throw smoke grenades over the vehicle's sides without hindrance. They must be

able to debus quickly with the minimum of restriction of movement. For these reasons, troop moves by troop carrying vehicles (TCV) should be conducted using the centre seating method with frames and canopies removed from vehicles and with tailboards down. TCVs should be sandbagged against mines and have bolt-on armour if available.

20. **Loading of TCVs**. Troop loading of vehicles should be covered in unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). Desirably, tactically viable groups should be carried in each vehicle.

21. **Convoy Commander**. The convoy commander should position himself where he considers he can best control the convoy. He must nominate a vehicle commander for each vehicle and brief them thoroughly before moving from the start point. He must always nominate a successor.

22. **Vehicle Commander**. A commander must be detailed for each vehicle. His task is to post sentries, ensure that all personnel are alert, and assist in maintaining convoy formations. He commands the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed. He must travel in the rear of the vehicle and not in the cabin with the driver.

23. **Vehicle Sentries**. Four sentries should be posted in the back of each TCV, two at the front, covering 1 600 mils each from front to side and two at the rear, covering 1 600 mls each from rear to side. Where possible, these sentries should be armed with automatic weapons. It is their task to take immediate action from those positions should the vehicle be ambushed and to cover the evacuation of the vehicle should it be brought to a halt. Sentries must also assist in control of the convoy by notifying the commander of any disruption in the convoy formation.

24. In addition to the sentries posted in the body of the vehicle, an additional soldier must be detailed to sit in the front seat of the vehicle's cabin beside the driver. The task of this individual, normally called the 'Shot Gun', is to assist the driver in controlling or stopping the vehicle in an emergency. If a vehicle is halted by enemy action the 'shot gun' stays with the vehicle to act as close protection for the driver, the vehicle, and any stores it may be carrying. He does not accompany any assault or sweep that may be carried out by the other troops in the convoy.

25. **Air Sentry**. Each vehicle must have an air sentry. The air sentry can be either the cabin passenger or an appointed passenger in the rear.

26. **Heavier Weapons**. Machine guns and anti-armour weapons should be distributed throughout the convoy. Where time and the means exist, mounts should be bolted to the truck to provide stable platforms.

BRIEFING

27. Briefing by the convoy commander before the convoy moves off must be detailed and explicit. All drivers and vehicle commanders should be present at the briefing and if possible, the men travelling in the convoy.

28. The briefing should include:

a. details of timings, routes, speed, density, order of march, maintenance of contact, procedure when contact is lost and action on breakdown;

b. distribution of personnel to vehicles and their conduct in them;

c. duties of vehicle commanders, sentries and details of action on ambush for that particular convoy; and

d. counter-ambush action or action for suspected ambush sites.

REHEARSALS

29. Once the distribution of personnel and convoy appointments are determined, all troops under their vehicle commanders should rehearse the counter-ambush action. Such rehearsals may not be necessary where the convoy consists of a formed body of troops which has retained its normal command chain and has been trained in convoy movement.

ACTION ON ENCOUNTERING A LIKELY AMBUSH SITE

30. The following actions should occur if a vehicle convoy encounters an area considered to be a likely ambush site but is not under fire:

a. The lead vehicle stops and informs the commander.

b. Remaining vehicles maintain convoy spacing and occupants watch their arcs.

c. Troops in the lead vehicle dismount and clear the area forward of the road-block on foot. If an armoured vehicle is available it should move forward to give direct fire support.

d. The commander orders other troops to clear the road of obstacles. Care must be taken because a roadblock is normally booby trapped or mined.

31. If a column comes under fire when it encounters a road-block a vehicle counter-ambush drill must be carried out.

ACTION ON AMBUSH

32. Every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the kill zone. When vehicles are fired on, the drivers should not stop, but should try to drive clear of the area. When vehicles are clear of the kill zone, they should stop to allow their occupants to dismount and carry out offensive action. Following vehicles approaching the kill zone should not run through the ambush, but halt clear of the area.

33. Where vehicles have been caught in the kill zone, the troops must debus, get off the road away from the enemy and take cover. Vehicle sentries cover the debussing with fire, including smoke if possible until the troops are in position to return fire.

34. Offensive action is then taken as described in previous chapters.

DEBUSSING

35. Debussing must be taught and practised as a drill. To aid debussing, all packs and stores will be stacked in the centre of the vehicle. Troops should hold their weapons at all times and spare machine gun belts should be in pouches, not in boxes.

36. The following is the procedure when the vehicle is forced to stop:

a. The vehicle commander shouts "DEBUS RIGHT" or "DEBUS LEFT" to indicate the direction in which the troops will muster.

b. Sentries return fire at targets in the direction from which enemy fire is coming.

c. Troops debus over both sides of the vehicle and dash in the direction indicated. As few troops as possible should attempt to debus over the tail of the vehicle.

d. As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, sentries debus and join the remainder.

e. The aim must now be to collect the fit men as a formed body for counter-action. Wounded troops must be attended to after counter-action has been taken.

37. The drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads. It is desirable that each vehicle load of personnel should consist of a formed body with its normal commander. However, where vehicle loads are made up from a mixed group of soldiers immediately before a journey, two or three practices must be held before the convoy moves off.

TRAINING

38. The appearance of a unit's road convoys can tell much about its state of operational efficiency. The enemy can read and interpret

the signs and tends to look for easier targets than those presented by a well-trained unit.

39. The danger of ambush must not be allowed to become a "hang up". Troops should be taught that, well prepared, they are more than a match for the enemy under any circumstances and that the contact afforded by a road ambush gives an opportunity to close with the enemy and destroy them.

40. When troops are efficient, alert and well disciplined, there is less likelihood of ambush.

SECTION 4
ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLES

AVOIDANCE OF AMBUSH

41. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) have a cross-country capability that allows troops to remain mounted and bypass or outflank many possible ambush sites. However, there may be times where movement is restricted to roads and tracks on which obstacles may be encountered. Troops should dismount and clear these obstacles prior to forward movement.

PREPARATORY ACTION

42. Map reconnaissance is required to identify likely ambush positions. The commander should have pre-selected targets 'on call' for artillery and mortars.

43. Preparedness is achieved by training to fight either mounted or dismounted. The commander must be positioned to control effectively the fire of weapons and movement of vehicles. Every member must have specific tasks when mounted, such as:

a. manning the machine guns and the cannons in the APCs and the LAVs all the time;

b. employing specific weapons from the open cargo hatch;

c. assistance with ammunition and backing up every weapon and firer if casualties occur; and

d. maintaining communications.

ACTION IF AMBUSH DETECTED

44. An alert force with a knowledge of enemy tactics may avoid being caught in an ambush. After an ambush is detected a quick attack is launched using conventional battle procedure. In special circumstances the ambush may be bypassed. All members of the force must be thoroughly briefed and rehearsed as to the commander's plan.

ACTION ON CONTACT

45. The action on contact is determined either by receiving warning of the ambush or by receiving fire. APCs and LAVs provide some protection from small arms and shrapnel and this may give the commander the time to:

a. identify the number and type of enemy weapons and personnel involved;

b. pinpoint the exact location of the enemy;

c. determine what the enemy is doing; and

d. appreciate his best course of action.

ACTION ON AMBUSH

46. If caught in an ambush, the APC or LAV must immediately return fire into the enemy position and drive out of the kill zone. If the escape routes are blocked, the troops must dismount quickly. There must be no hesitation in the kill zone. The force must be drilled in the actions it is to undertake. All actions carried out must be rapid, pre-

planned and clearly understood by all. Several tasks may have to be accomplished at once; these being primarily to:

a. return fire, move and report;

b. return fire, report then move; or

c. if warning of the ambush is obtained first; report, move and fire.

SECTION 5
COUNTER-AMBUSH ACTION FOR WATERCRAFT

GENERAL

47. Waterways are used either:

a. as a means to deploy troops into an operational area; or

b. for the logistic support of troops already deployed.

48. Because of their nature, waterways provide ideal ambush locations and accordingly counter-ambush plans need to be made when using them. These plans must take into account the distinctive characteristics of the various watercrafts that may be available.

AVOIDANCE OF AMBUSH

49. Ambushes set on water-ways can be avoided or their effects minimized by:

a. protecting critical areas;

b. clearing vegetation from likely ambush sites;

c. using irregular schedules; and

d. patrolling the water-ways and banks, particularly by air.

50. The effects of an ambush can be reduced by:

a. employing tactical spacing and movement;

b. mounting automatic weapons on each boat; and

c. maintaining communications between each boat.

PREPARATORY ACTION

51. **Personnel, Weapons and Equipment**. During an engagement, boats may be overturned. Therefore, the following preliminary measures are necessary:

a. **Personnel**. A lifejacket should be used, however, if it is used it must be appreciated that this may prevent the user from diving and keep the soldier exposed on the surface of the water. All members of the crew and the party should be swimmers or have undergone special watermanship training. The following assists in giving some freedom of movement in the water:

(1) personnel should remove packs and place them in the boats;

(2) webbing equipment should be loosened, and worn over the life-jacket, so that it can be quickly discarded; and

(3) the ends of trousers should be pulled out of the boots, andshirts should be buttoned to the neck, and freed of the waistband of the trousers.

b. **Weapons**. In the event of the boat overturning it is essential that the weapons are recoverable. They should be secured to the boat by quick release ties and in such a way that they can be fired by individuals while sitting in the boat.

c. **Propeller**. Troops entering the water should try to keep as far away from the propeller as possible.

d. **Packs and Webbing**. In the event of a boat overturning it must be accepted that some packs and equipment may be lost. During water moves, therefore, at least one spare magazine should be carried in a shirt pocket.

e. **Stores**. The centre of gravity must be kept as low as possible and stores should be spread along the length of the floor and not piled. Similarly, troops should sit on the floor or the seats provided and not on top of packs, ration boxes, petrol, etc.

f. Depending on the boat, troops may be seated in linear or double fashion.

COUNTER-AMBUSH DRILLS

52. The problems are very similar to those encountered in motor vehicle ambushes and require similar preparation. These are as follows:

a. preparation and preliminary briefing;

b. convoy system of tactical spacing;

c. rehearsals before moving into enemy territory; and

d. tactical movement.

53. If ambushed the following must occur:

a. immediate fire reaction, including smoke and all fire support available; and

b. those boats not ambushed must make for the bank on which the ambush is sited and launch offensive action.

ANNEX A
THE IMMEDIATE AMBUSH

GENERAL

1. There are occasions when a patrol, without being seen itself, sights an enemy party approaching either on a track, or across a clearing, or in a forest. This is most likely to occur when the patrol has halted and the enemy is on the move. It is obviously better to allow the enemy to approach as close as possible before opening fire on him. If the patrol is on the move there may be time only for a silent signal to be passed through the patrol, to move quietly and quickly into the positions indicated and for the signal to open fire to be given when the enemy reaches the position in which he is most vulnerable.

PRINCIPLES

2. The following principles should be observed:

   a. good battle discipline is essential to ensure that no shot is fired in the excitement of the moment when the enemy is first sighted;

   b. field signals must be used;

   c. movement must be quick, silent and where possible concealed;

   d. the commander, who should normally spring the ambush, must control the action; and

   e. the degree of success achieved depends on the initiative of the commander concerned and the battlecraft of the troops.

3. For an explanatory diagram, see Figure A-1.

DRILL

4. The immediate ambush drill must be a drill that has been rehearsed and understood by all members of the group. This drill can be used only when the enemy is moving towards the patrol:

a. The leading scout passes a field signal back as he sees the enemy approaching and the patrol commander gives the field signal for immediate ambush.

b. In some cases (such as when the enemy is very close before the leading scout sees him) there may not be time for this. Patrol commanders must therefore delegate to the leading scout or another member the authority for giving the immediate ambush field signal should circumstances dictate.

c. On seeing the signal, the leading group takes up fire positions that have cover from view and remain still even if they have not assumed a good fire position. The enemy may be too close for their positions to be adjusted.



Figure A-1: The Immediate Ambush

d. Other groups further from the enemy adopt fire positions aimed into the proposed kill zone. The siting of machine guns is critical.

e. The signal to open fire is normally be given by the patrol commander who should be able to see when the machine gun has a good target. Nevertheless everyone must be ready to open fire if the enemy becomes aware of the ambush before the signal is given. Men should remain in position until ordered to move by the patrol commander.

5. Subsequent action by the patrol commander and ambush party is similar to the deliberate ambush, if time and opportunity permits.

6. Other formations and circumstances demand different drills for the immediate ambush. These should be worked out and rehearsed. In open country it may be preferable to carry out a contact drill quietly, if a linear type ambush is not possible and the patrol has been observed by the enemy.

ANNEX B
AMBUSH ORDERS FORMAT

1. **Ground Briefing**: Reference Points

   a. Air Photo;

   b. Map Brief;

   c. Model Sketch;

   d. Recce (if possible)

   e. Weather:

      (1) Forecast:

         (a) Temp:

         (b) Wind:

      (2) Astronomical Data:

         (a) First light:

         (b) Last light:

         (c) State of moon:

         (d) Moon rise:

         (e) Moon set:

         (f) Sunrise:

         (g) Sunset:

      (3) Other (effects on Friendly Forces/Enemy):

   f. Terrain:

      (1) Type:

(2) Movement:

(3) Vision:

(4) Camouflage:

(5) Area of Operations: (Note reliability of Trails/Streams for navigation, etc.)

(6) Other (effects on Friendly Forces/Enemy):

2. **Situation**:

a. **Enemy**:

(1) Strength/Capabilities:

(2) Known/Suspected Locations:

(3) Activity:

(4) Probable Course of Action:

(5) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) & Air Cap:

(6) Weapons:

(7) Formations:

(8) Habits:

(9) Other:

b. **Friendly**:

(1) Commander's Intent:

(2) Location and Planned Actions of Units on Right and Left:

(3) Fire Support Available:

(4) Tasks other sub-units:

(5) Missions & Routes other patrols:

(6) Planned actions of Friendly Forces:

(7) Other:

c. **Atts and Dets:**

(1) OPCOM/OPCON:

(2) TACOM/TACON:

d. **Locals:**

3. **Mission**: .....will ambush.....in order to.....

4. **Execution**:

a. Concept of operations (general outline).

This Operation will be conducted in _____ phase(s)

(1) Phase One/Insertion -

(2) Phase Two/Action on Obj -

(3) Phase Three/Extraction -

b. Groupings and Tasks:

(1) Phase 1:

(a) Grouping:

(b) Tasks:

(2) Phase 2:

(a) Grouping:

(a) Tasks:

(3) Phase 3:

(a) Grouping:

(a) Tasks:

Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Timings:

(a) Rehearsals

(b) Time out:

(c) Ambush set:

(d) Ambush sprung:

(e) Ambush withdrawn:

(f) Time in:

(2) Formations/Order of March:

(3) Routes:

(4) Passage of Friendly Positions:

(a) Passage Out: Guide_____
Time:_____ Where:_____

(b) Re-entry: Guide_____
Time:_____ Where:_____

(5) Rendezvous (RVs) and actions at RVs: (to be rehearsed)

(6) Actions on Objective: (to be rehearsed)

(7) Actions on Initiation:

(a) Assault:

i. Rates of fire:

ii. Timings:

(b) Support:

i. Rates of Fire:

ii. Timings;

(c) Security:

i. Rates of fire:

ii. Timings:

(8) Actions when crossing Obstacles: (to be rehearsed)

(9) Action on Enemy Contact: (to be rehearsed)

(a) Action on contact moving to ORV:

(b) Action on contact with recce party away:

(c) Action on contact setting up Ambush:

(d) Action on contact during Commander's recce:

(e) Action on contact without Patrol Commander:

(10) Action if lost or separated in patrol order of march/en route:

(11) Action on illumination or trip flare: (to be rehearsed)

(12) Withdrawal procedures (to be rehearsed). Action on withdrawing cut-off (primary and alternate):

(13) Action on counter-ambush (day/night):

(14) Action on aircraft/helicopter (if required):

(15) Fire Support (if not already covered)

(a) Direct:

(b) Indirect:

(16) Action on noise in kill zone (following ambush):

(17) Action on loss of communications:

(a) Action on loss of communications moving to ORV:

(b) Action on loss of communications with recce party:

(c) Action on loss of communications on setting up ambush:

(d) Action on loss of communications with Patrol Commander:

(18) Deception plan:

(19) Debrief:

(20) Patrol Report:

(21) Essential Elements of Information (EEI):

(22) Other Information Requirements (OIR):

(a) Assault/Support Positions:

5. **Service Support**:

a. Supply:

(1) Rations:

(2) Water:

(3) Weapons:

(a) Ammo:

(4) Uniform and eqpt:

(5) Special eqpt:

(6) Method of cas evac: (by priority)

(7) Method of handling prisoners of war (PWs):

(8) Captured En Eqpt:

b. Transport:

c. Re-supply:

d. Rest:

6. **Command and Signals**:

a. Signal:

(1) Signals operating Instructions SOIs

(a) Higher HQ - C/S:_____

(b) Patrol - C/S:_____

(c) Other Patrol - C/S:_____

(d) Frequency:

i. Prim:_____

ii. Alt:_____

(e) Codewords:

(2) Signals, primary and alternate, for:

(a) enemy are approaching:

(b) open fire/initiation:

(c) cease fire:

(d) assault:

(e) searching group out:

(f) withdraw:

i. Assault:

ii. Support:

iii. Security:

(g) abandon position:

(3) Challenge and Passwords

(a) Coy (Behind forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)): _____

(b) Patrol Number (Forward FEBA): _____

(c) Running (During departure of FEBA): _____

(4) Nicknames:

(5) Radio Check:_____hrs.

b. Command

(1) Loc of ptl comd and 2IC:

(a) Phase One:

(b) Phase Two:

(c) Phase Three:

(2) Chain of Command:

7. **Safety**

8. **Time Check**

9. **Questions**

ANNEX C
NOTES ON THE USE OF FLARES

TYPES OF FLARES

1. Detail on the following flares is contained in B-GL-385-007/PT-001, *Grenades and Pyrotechnics*:

a. flare, surface, trip, parachute M48;

b. flare, surface, trip M49A1; and

c. C3 hand fired parachute flare.

EMPLOYMENT

2. Flares may be used singly or in improvised methods. The main uses are in ambush or defence. They are extremely useful as silent sentries in dead ground. In the illumination of the kill zone it is important that they not be set off prematurely by animals or falling branches and hence an electrical method of ignition is recommended.

SITING

3. Since there is a natural tendency to look at a light source which appears in the darkness, flares should be sited so that they are shaded from the eyes of the troops employing them. The adverse effect on the soldiers' night vision capability is somewhat curtailed by shading.

4. For best effect, flares should be at waist height from the ground. This often necessitates lashing the flare to a stake that has been driven into the earth.

5. Camouflage is vital if the flare is not to give away the ambush site.

IGNITION OF THE M49A1 TRIP FLARE

6. The M49A1 can be ignited using many techniques. Three methods are described in this article and illustrated in Figures C-1, C-2 and C-3. They are:

a. firing the flare with detonating cord inserted in the recess on top of the flare;

b. firing the flare with detonating cord taped on top of the trip flare recess; and

c. firing the flare with a detonator inserted and taped in the recess of the trip flare.

7. In all of the above three methods, a trip flare, or a cluster of three flares is nailed to a wooden post, which in turn may be attached to a metal picket, and driven into the ground. At a height of from one to one-and-a-half meters a cluster of three flares illuminates an area up to 75 metres in radius.

8. The flares are ignited by means of detonating cord, or a detonator, which are initiated electrically to ensure proper timing of the ambush. In all of the methods described here the fly-off lever is removed. To prevent accidentally activating the flare, the lever must be kept in place under constant pressure while the safety clip is removed. The pull pin is then fully inserted in place in the holes which are immediately under the cover, and adjacent to the shoulders which retain the safety clip. The lever can only then be safely removed. The pull pin is left in place during firing.



Figure C-1: Initiation of Trip Flares—Detonating Cord Inserted in Recess on Flare



Figure C-2: Initiation of Trip Flare—Detonating Cord Taped to Top of Flare Recess



Figure C-3: Initiation of Flare—Detonator Taped in Flare Recess

ANNEX D
IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILL

1. This drill is required when caught by an enemy ambush. See Figure D-1. Related notes are as follows:

   a. the position of the patrol on contact is shown at "A";

   b. arrows in "B" indicate the route taken by members of the patrol who were not pinned to the ground by the opening burst of fire; and

   c. also shown at "B" are the positions of patrol members formed up ready to assault.

2. The speed with which the encircling attack can be put into effect is increased if troops are trained to recognise likely enemy ambush positions and the type of fire they will hear if they do run into an ambush.

3. Survivors of the leading group(s) call out "Ambush Left (or Right)" then move to fire positions and engage the enemy. The leading group should always be a tactical bound ahead of the patrol commander.

4. This drill can be worked in reverse if the enemy allows the leading elements of a patrol to pass and takes on its rear elements.

5. The time taken to encircle varies according to the nature of the ground and the extent of the enemy position but is rarely less than ten minutes.

6. Commanders select the direction of movement for the assault according to the nature of the ground.



A. On Contact

B. After order "AMBUSH LEFT"

Figure D-1: Immediate Action Drill

ANNEX E
NOTES ON THE USE OF SANDBAGS FOR VEHICLE PROTECTION

1. A single row of sandbags, stacked five high is placed down each side of the truck. Firing tests indicate that this single row of sandbags stops most small arms fire.

2. The troops sit, facing outwards, on an improvised bench set in the centre of the truck bed.

3. Ideally automatic weapons should be positioned at each corner. If these weapons are not available, at least two should be carried, with one firmly sandbagged in place on the cab top and one at the rear.

4. Approximately 70 filled sandbags are required for each truck. The average weight of each bag is about 40 pounds, for a total weight of 2 800 pounds. Troops and equipment weigh an additional 2 300 pounds, thus giving a total vehicle load of 5100 pounds. This load permits cross country operations without undue wear on the vehicle. See Figure E-1.



Figure E-1: Use of Sandbags in Vehicles